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Abstract
The Covid-19 crisis has revamped the discussion about the redefinition of GVC. 
This paper contributes to the debate, analysing the productive relationships between 
European countries in four key manufacturing activities. In particular, the paper 
addresses two objectives. First, it maps the degree of productive integration in 
Europe, focusing on the generation of employment in the production of exported 
intermediate inputs and final goods. Second, it provides a preliminary assessment 
of the potential impact on employment that the current economic crisis will have 
on some manufacturing activities across Europe. The analysis is realised employing 
the concept of vertically integrated labour (Pasinetti 1973) which allows to account 
for the employment directly and indirectly involved in the production of final goods. 
The estimations are derived from Multi-Regional Input–Output tables to map the 
supply chain and to differentiate between the employment involved in the produc-
tion of exported intermediate inputs and final goods. The results show that most of 
the employment involved in the production of final output of the activities studied 
in the paper is linked to international trade. Although Europe shows a high degree 
of productive links, there are important differences in the modality of insertion in 
the productive structure of European countries. Moreover, the impact on the level 
of employment due to the current economic crisis can be significant, affecting more 
than 1.3 million of people in Europe. These results are relevant to policy makers, 
who should consider carefully the high degree of linkages of the European econo-
mies when designing industrial policies and measure of support to the economy.
Keywords Vertically integrated labour · Covid-19 · Global value chains · Productive 
integration
 * Davide Villani 
 davide.villani@open.ac.uk
1 The Open University (UK), Goldsmiths College, University of London, Milton Keynes, London, 
England
2 Joint Research Centre, European Commission, Seville, Spain
 Journal of Industrial and Business Economics
1 3
JEL Classification C67 · J21 · L16
1 Introduction
After approximately a decade from the global financial collapse, a new crisis, trig-
gered by the Covid-19 pandemics, is shaking the global economy. The effects on the 
economy are likely to be prolonged, in what already appears to be the most severe 
economic downturn since the Great Depression (Gopinath 2020).
Most of the studies published so far that deal with the consequences of the cur-
rent crisis are concerned with aggregate figures like GDP (IMF 2020) or with the 
direct sectoral repercussion (e.g. McKenzie 2020), neglecting the indirect impact 
that the economic lockdown imposed across countries and the loss in final demand 
will have on the supply chain. However, for a thorough assessment of the implica-
tions of an external shock on the productive system it is important to focus not only 
on the effects that it may have on a specific industry, but also the backward linkages 
of the supply chain. The relevance of Global Value Chains (GVC) and the role of 
trade in intermediate goods (Johnson and Noguera 2012; Kleinert 2003; Miroudot 
et al. 2009), impose a systemic consideration of the production processes.
The paper addresses these aspects by focusing on two research objectives: first, 
it maps the degree of productive integration of four productive activities in Europe, 
focusing on the generation of employment in the production of exported intermedi-
ate inputs and final goods. Second, the paper provides a preliminary assessment of 
the potential impact of the ongoing economic crisis on the level of employment in 
some manufacturing activities across Europe. To the best of our knowledge, this is 
the first study to assess the impact in these activities with a similar degree of detail 
at the European level. While the present research will not engage directly with fore-
casts regarding the impact of the current Covid-19 crisis on the degree of integration 
of the European supply chain, it offers useful elements to consider the possible prop-
agation mechanisms, along the supply chain, of the Covid-19 crisis and to design 
effective industrial policies.
The analysis considers four key activities of the European manufacturing: Manu-
facture of Motor Vehicles; Manufacture of Other Transport Equipment; Manufacture 
of Computers, Electronics and Optical goods; Manufacture of Textiles,1 using the 
notion of subsystem (Sraffa 1960) and vertically integrated labour (Pasinetti 1973).
This approach enables to quantify the amount of employment that depends, 
directly and indirectly, on these four activities (henceforth, the term subsystems will 
be used to denote the focus on both direct and indirect relations of production). In 
particular, the empirical analysis will distinguish between the employment involved 
in the production of intermediate and final goods (for domestic and foreign con-
sumption) and differentiate the impact among 27 European countries. Calculations 
are performed in a Multi-Regional Input–Output (MRIO) framework which allows 
1 For simplicity, hereafter these activities will be referred to as, respectively, Automotive; Other Trans-
portation, Computer and Electronics, and Textiles.
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to account for the role played by international trade (of intermediate and final prod-
ucts) in the production process.
What emerges from the empirical analysis is the predominance of foreign mar-
kets: most of the employment in these four subsystems can be associated to the 
production of exported goods (both in intermediate and final goods). Moreover, the 
multi-regional level of analysis allows to establish which countries are more exposed 
to the downturn in the level of activity due to a breakdown of the value chain, both 
in terms of production and final consumption. Then, the paper provides some pre-
liminary estimates of the potential impact, in terms of jobs losses, of the current 
economic crisis in the four subsystems studied here. We find that the impact on the 
employment levels in these subsystems can be significant, and especially concen-
trated in the Automotive supply chain. These findings have important implications 
for economic policy. Industrial strategies and the recovery measures that will be put 
in place should take into consideration the high degree of productive linkages exist-
ing among European countries. The high reliance on exports implies that uncoordi-
nated domestic measures alone may be insufficient in stimulating economic recov-
ery. Finally, the paper argues that ideal economic policies should aim at reverting 
the disparity that has mounted in the last decades in Europe (Guarascio and Simon-
azzi 2016) in terms of productive capacity and technological catch up.
The paper is organised as follow, Sect. 2 presents the relevant literature and dis-
cusses it in light of our objectives. Section 3 describes in detail the methodology 
used for the calculation of vertically integrated labour. Section 4 presents the results 
of the empirical analysis and Sect. 5 discusses the main findings and some relevant 
policy issues.
2  Literature review and discussion
The economic crisis induced by the Covid-19 pandemic is going to have a deep 
impact on economic activity (IMF 2020; Maliszewska et  al. 2020). However, the 
negative shock will be heterogeneous across industries and countries since some 
manufacturing activities are more exposed to the current crisis than others. One 
of the aspects that characterises the current situation is the  variety of disruptions 
channels which derive from both the supply and demand side. On the supply side, 
both physical distancing and economic lockdown had, although different across 
countries, a direct impact on the production processes of good and services, where 
the intensity of the productive disruptions is reinforced by the strong supply chain 
links. On the demand side, the drop in aggregate demand and the postponement 
of the purchase of durable goods are likely to have long-lasting effects on produc-
tion (Baldwin and Tomiura 2020). These aspects are especially relevant for the four 
industries analysed in this paper. These activities represent 20.5% of total employ-
ment at the industry level in European manufacturing. Their importance is even 
more striking when considering the indirect relations of production. If we account 
also for the employed generated indirectly in the production of the final output of 
these industries, the share of employment amount to 35% of the total activated by 
manufacturing in Europe (see Sect. 4 for details). Another common aspect is that 
 Journal of Industrial and Business Economics
1 3
the four industries analysed in this paper have been classified as non-essential in 
most countries and had to partially or completely stop producing during the peak 
of the pandemic (Fana et al. 2020) which, in combination with the strong reduction 
in final demand that they are likely to suffer, may lead to a sizeable reduction in the 
employment levels. Lockdown measures had a great impact on the level of activ-
ity. Giammetti et al. (2020) estimate that the lockdown measures had an impact of 
approximately 52% of circulating value added. These findings are in line with those 
performed including a richer pool of countries, that estimate a reduction between 30 
and 50% of the level of activity during the first lockdown (OECD 2020a).
When assessing the impact of an economic shock on the productive structure, the 
high level of interdependence of manufacturing activities in Europe, both in terms 
of productive linkages and as source of demand of final products (Eurofound 2019), 
imposes to focus not only on the direct, industry-level, relations of production, but 
also to acknowledge the indirect effects on the industries that provide intermediate 
inputs. Some researchers are already considering the possibility that the ongoing cri-
sis may lead to a deep rearrangement of the international productive processes, fuel-
ling the reshoring of western companies (e.g. see Seric and Winkler 2020; Strange 
2020). This discussion links with the existing contributions that focus on the pro-
cess of deglobalization and reshoring (for an overview see De Backer et al. 2016). 
While there is some evidence of reshoring in some activities in the last decade, this 
is not sufficient to constitute a reversal in the aggregate trend (Bailey and De Propris 
2014; Kinkel 2014). In fact, reshoring is, so far, a limited phenomenon among Euro-
pean firms and mostly confined to companies that move back production from Asia 
but not from other European countries (Dachs et al. 2019). Another possibility that 
is being considered is that the supply chains will become more regionalised (Zhan 
et al. 2020). According to this view, instead of counting with strong global/intercon-
tinental links, supply chains may be reoriented towards the exploitation of produc-
tive links in a certain region/continent. This latter scenario would be extremely rel-
evant for the European context, where many countries are distributed in a relatively 
small geographical area. Independently from the evolution of the GVC reconfigu-
ration that will follow the current economic crisis, it is paramount to examine the 
potential impact of the current economic crisis on the existing productive structure 
in the context of the high degree of productive integration existing in Europe. While 
the present research will not engage directly with forecasts regarding the impact 
of the current Covid-19 crisis on the degree of integration of the European supply 
chain, it offers useful elements to consider the possible propagation mechanisms, 
along the supply chain, of the Covid-19 crisis and to design effective industrial 
policies.
The importance that offshoring and trade in intermediate inputs play in the pro-
ductive integration of Europe has been highlighted by the literature. For example, 
Marin (2006) shows the expansion of German and Austrian companies in Eastern 
European (EE) countries to offshore intermediate steps of production. Miroudot 
et al. (2009) stress that European countries have experienced a considerable increase 
in trade in intermediate goods at the beginning of the 2000s. More recently, Tim-
mer et al. (2013) account for the generalised increase of employment activated by 
the production of intermediate inputs and the rise of imported intermediates versus 
1 3
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domestically sourced intermediate inputs. Overall, these works provide precious 
insights about the general trends witnessed in the manufacturing sectors in Europe. 
None of these studies, however, provide a thorough mapping of the role of European 
trade in intermediates for the four activities considered in this paper.
For this reason, and in relation to our first objective, this paper maps the degree 
of integration in the four economic activities mentioned earlier. In particular, we are 
interested in understanding what type of employment (whether for the production 
of intermediate exported inputs or final goods) is activated by the four subsystems 
across European countries.
This analysis relates to the recent debate around the growth model to be imple-
mented. As noted in the literature, core countries (e.g. Germany) underwent a reor-
ganisation of their trade and manufacturing, with a shift in exports from Southern 
European (SE)2 countries towards China and an expansion of their industrial base 
in the Eastern periphery (Celi et al. 2019). The increasing international competition 
has been often employed as a justification to implement internal devaluation strate-
gies, whose aim is to foster exports rather than favouring domestic demand (Uxó 
et al. 2014). This reconfiguration of the European Value Chains has been accompa-
nied by different trends in sectoral specialisation which, in turn, shaped the dynam-
ics of the occupational structures across European regions. As shown by Gräbner 
et  al. (2020a, b) Germany is characterised by a higher share of exports in more 
complex goods than SE countries while Eastern European countries have benefitted 
from a structural upgrade (Stöllinger 2016). Hurley et al. (2019) show that in some 
EE countries like Poland the share of medium and high paid workers has increased 
more than at the European level while SE has been characterised by the increase in 
low-paid jobs. In this sense, Celi et al. (2020) report that, since 2010, SE countries 
have witnessed a boom in the number of firms in services like the Tourism indus-
try, reducing the presence of manufacturing firms, while core countries experienced 
the opposite trend. Similar to these studies, our research contributes to the literature 
regarding the pattern of specialisation and job creation in Europe. By distinguishing 
between the employment embodied in the trade of intermediate and the employment 
that does not leave the domestic supply chain it is possible to provide a characterisa-
tion of the type of insertion of a certain country in the supply chain. For example, a 
high generation of employment associated to the trade in intermediate inputs indi-
cates a high reliance on the decision of production taken by companies located in 
third countries.
With respect to the second objective, this paper provides a preliminary study 
about the potential impact of the ongoing economic downturn on the employment 
generated in these subsystems. At this stage, it is not easy to quantify the effect that 
the ongoing crisis will have in terms of jobs loss. The impact on employment will be 
largely influenced by the duration of the pandemic and by the response adopted by 
policy makers to support both the supply and demand side (see Sect. 4 for a detailed 
discussion). It is however possible to provide some estimates of the consequences 
that the current crisis could have on the industries directly involved in this analysis 
2 Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
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and on the industries taking part indirectly in the supply chain as provider of inter-
mediate inputs. This analysis will consider the direct impact as well as the indirect 
effects. The relevance of considering the fall in the level of trade in intermediates 
following economic crises has been documented in different works (e.g. Alessan-
dria et al. 2010) together with the necessity of accounting for the indirect spillovers 
of a fall in final demand on other countries (Bems et al. 2010). These aspects are 
especially valid for the activities studied in this paper, given the high participation 
intermediate suppliers and the high degree of outsourcing (e.g. see Sturgeon et al. 
2008 on Automotive).
Overall, this analysis is essential to design effective economic policies. Industrial 
policies are coming back on the agenda (Wade 2012; Rullani et  al. 2016) and, at 
least formally, are at the centre of the European strategy for the upcoming years 
(EC 2019). However, as it has been highlighted by some authors (Celi et al. 2018; 
Stöllinger 2016), the process of productive integration and participation in GVC 
has not benefitted equally all European countries. One of the risks of the ongoing 
economic crisis is that the existing polarisation will be deepened, similarly to what 
happened in the previous recent economic crises, and that given the existing pro-
ductive structures SE countries will be the most affected (Gräbner et al. 2020a, b). 
Because of the productive heterogeneity and the high level of productive linkages of 
the European manufacturing, domestic uncoordinated policies may be insufficient to 
restore the employment level. In this sense, Portella-Carbó and Dejuan (2019) have 
showed that an uncoordinated expansionary fiscal policy at the European level may 
reinforce the productive disparities between core and peripheral areas in Europe. In 
theory, this crisis could be the opportunity to reopen the debate about the imbal-
ances that have manifested in the Europe in the last decades (see Simonazzi et al. 
2013). Along these lines, different contributions highlight the necessity of a collec-
tive response to the crisis. Coveri et  al. (2020) advocate for a coordinated indus-
trial policy that aims at reducing the productive asymmetries that have grown in 
Europe in the last decades, with a special attention at the vulnerability that derives 
from hyper specialisation in some segments of the supply chain. As it will be argued 
below, the concentration in some parts of the supply chain (e.g. in the production 
of exported intermediate inputs) may increase the degree of vulnerability of some 
countries. The need for coordinated monetary, fiscal and industrial policies is espe-
cially important in the current context, with an accentuated global crisis which 
affects both the demand and the supply side (Baldwin and Weder Di Mauro, 2020) 
and would need a considerable revision of the current inflexible policy framework 
(for a discussion see Celi et al. 2020; Pianta et al. 2020).
In order to promote coordinated productive policies, it is essential to have a clear 
picture of the productive links and their geographical distribution. This would pro-
vide valuable elements to design economic measures that take into consideration the 
specificities of the supply chains, at the domestic and European level. As an empiri-
cal exercise aimed at stating the importance of productive integration, we restrict 
our analysis to a selection of manufacturing industries. Although this choice does 
not allow to draw conclusions for the whole manufacturing sectors in Europe, it per-
mits to focus on some specificities of the selected activities. The selection made in 
the paper considers the heterogeneity of industrial activities in that our four sectors 
1 3
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differ in their contribution to overall EU value added, value of intermediate inputs 
and their employment share over total EU-27 employment. The four sectors are 
characterised by different levels of technological content, according to the classifica-
tion proposed by Galindo-Rueda and Verger (2016), with Computer and Electronics 
being High Tech; Automotive being Medium–High Tech and Textiles being clas-
sified as Medium–Low Tech. According to this classification, Other transportation 
includes both High Tech (Air and Spacecrafts) and Medium–High Tech (Railroad 
and Ship building) activities.
3  Methodology
In order to deal with our research objectives, this paper employs the notion of verti-
cally integrated labour, based on the concept of vertically integrated sectors or sub-
systems (Pasinetti 1973). One of the major advantages of this approach is that it 
allows to deal with both direct and indirect relations of production. This means that 
it is possible to account not only for the direct impacts of a loss in activity in the spe-
cific industry under analysis, but to quantify also the (indirect) effects on the indus-
tries that provide intermediate inputs to a given industry (and on the industries that 
provide intermediate goods to the intermediate inputs industries and so on).3
Vertically integrated labour is calculated as follows. Using a Multi-Regional 
Input–Output (MRIO) framework, the vector of total output is equal to the sum of 
intermediate inputs produced and net output:
where Z represents the multi-regional transactions matrix composed by r * s sub-
matrices. Each sub-matrix rs on the main (r = s) diagonal represents the matrix of 
domestic transactions, and off-diagonal sub-matrices are the matrices of interna-
tional transactions of intermediate inputs, i.e. imported inputs (see Miller and Blair 
2009, Chapter 3). Each industry in column j in the submatrix rs (dimension i * j) 
demands intermediate inputs from the industries indicated in rows i. The term x is 
the multi-regional vector4 of total output, y the multi-regional vector of net output 
(i.e. final demand) and i is the sum-vector of appropriate length. Expression (1) can 
be reformulated as:










 ) indicates input from industry i and country r demanded for the production 
process of sector j in country s. Following few manipulations, the vector of total out-
put can be expressed as:
(1) =  + 
(2) =  + 
3 For an illustration of this point see Pasinetti (Pasinetti, 1977, Chapter 4).
4 Lower-case bold letters denote vectors and upper-case bold letters matrices. All vectors are column 
vectors unless explicitly denoted by the superscript T. The superscript ̂ refers to a diagonalised vector.
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 where I is the identity matrix and ( − )−1 is the MRIO Leontief inverse matrix 
of dimension ri * sj. Pre-multiplying the right-hand side of Eq. (3) by the vector of 
direct labour coefficients ( T
l
= ̂−1 , where l is the vector of employment by indus-
try), we finally obtain the vector of vertically integrated labour as:
where the vector of vertically integrate labour ( T
vi
 ) represents the amount of total 
labour needed in each subsystem j in country s to satisfy the level of final demand. 
The focus on the subsystem, instead of industry level implies that the values in T
vi
 
represent the number of units of labour employed directly and indirectly (i.e. in the 
production, direct and indirect, of the intermediate inputs and so on) in each subsys-
tem and country in the production of final output. The vector T
vi
 in Eq. (4) is a con-
cise indicator that does not differentiate between the employment generated domes-
tically or in other countries, i.e. via the demand of imported inputs of production. 
As argued above, this is a crucial aspect to take into consideration in contemporary 
manufacturing activities, since a consistent part of the workforce is employed in the 
production of intermediate inputs that are then employed in different countries and 
industries.
To differentiate between the domestic and imported employment demanded by 
a given subsystem it is sufficient to employ the diagonalised vector of direct labour 
coefficients in Eq. (4), so that:
By doing so, we obtain a matrix of vertically integrated labour ( vi ) where the 
cells of each column indicate the employment needed from the activity i and coun-
try r in the production of subsystem j in country s.
Data employed for the estimations of this paper are obtained from the World 
Input–Output Database (Timmer et al. 2015). This database provides MRIO tables 
that map the global economy with data for 43 countries (and one “rest of the world” 
region) and 56 industries organised at the 2 digit ISIC 4 level (Timmer et al. 2016). 
The estimations are based on the most recent year available in the database, 2014. 
Although it would have been ideal to have more updated data, this database provides 
a good approximation of the existing productive structure.
Note that this approach is based on physical units of labour that are embodied in 
the final production of goods which reflects the standard demand-driven orientation 
of the original Leontief model (Leontief 1944). Furthermore, another significant 
aspect of this type of analysis is that the variable of interest (i.e. vertically integrated 
labour) is expressed in physical terms as units of employment that are directly and 
indirectly employed in the production of a certain final output which represents a 
difference to other MRIO estimations based on value added (e.g. OECD Trade in 
Values Added database). By expressing the unit of interest in physical terms, this 
approach allows to focus on the technical features of the productive chain without 
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being influenced by wage differentials across countries. In this way, only technical 
changes that affect the amount of labour employed in the production process are 
grasped by the vector (and matrix) of vertically integrated labour, being neutral to 
the evolution of unit labour costs.
4  Results
This section presents the empirical results for a selection of manufacturing activi-
ties in Europe: Automotive, Other transportation, Computers and electronics and 
Textiles.
The first look at the results is represented by the estimation of the number of peo-
ple employed by subsystem. Differently from the standard industry-level studies, the 
estimates at the subsystem level capture the number of workers employed in those 
industries that directly and indirectly participate in the production of final output in 
each subsystem. Figure 1 shows that all these activities involve a higher amount of 
labour at the subsystem level than they do at the direct (industry) level. The differ-
ence between industry and subsystem level is particularly marked for Automotive 
and Other Transportation, indicating the relevance of the backward linkages that the 
production of the final goods in these subsystems entail.
In order to account for the role played by intermediate inputs in the generation 
of employment, for each country and subsystem, we further split, from the matrix 
of vertically integrated labour vi , the total amount of labour between the labour 
force that is generated by the foreign demand of intermediate inputs and the fraction 
involved (directly and indirectly) in the domestic production of final goods.
Figure 2 illustrates the total amount of employment activated by these subsys-
tems in 2000 and 2014 and differentiates between the participation of the employ-
ment embodied in the production of exported intermediates inputs and the labour 
Fig. 1  Number of labour units (thousands) employed at the direct-industry level and subsystem for the 
whole sample of European countries. Year 2014.  Source: Author’s elaboration using the WIOD database
 Journal of Industrial and Business Economics
1 3
that is embodied in the domestic production of final goods. First, it is worth 
noticing that the total European labour force involved in the four subsystems has 
diminished considerably between 2000 and 2014, with the only exception of the 
Other Transportation subsystem. This aspect reflects the process of downsizing 
of the manufacturing activities recorded at the beginning of the century which 
has been enhanced by the process of offshoring and the increase in the number 
of extra-European competitors (Stöllinger et al. 2013). Moreover, this reduction 
should not be imputed to the outsourcing process that took place at the industry 
level, since this figure does not refer exclusively to direct employment but also 
includes the indirect relations of production. Second, the share of labour involved 
in the production of exported intermediate goods and services grew remarkably 
between 2000 and 2014 among all the subsystems. Approximately 40% of the 
total European employment is activated by the trade in intermediate inputs show-
ing the increasing fragmentation of the production processes within European 
economies.
For a more detailed assessment of the relative importance of these subsystems in 
terms of employment creation across European countries, the first four columns in 
Table 1 show the distribution of the total employment by subsystem across Euro-
pean countries while the last column represents the share of total employment 
of each country over total employment in Europe. A share of labour created in a 
certain subsystem that is higher than the share of total employment of the coun-
try at the European level (last column) indicates that the subsystem has a relatively 
higher relevance for the country compared to its average participation in European 
employment.
Fig. 2  Share of employment involved in the production of exported intermediate inputs over total 
employment and units of employment (thousands) by subsystem in 2000 and 2014 for the whole sample 
of European countries.  Source: Author’s elaboration using the WIOD database
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From this table it can be appreciated that the four subsystems are particularly 
relevant for Germany and the non-Baltic Eastern European (EE) countries.5 These 
countries record at least two subsystems whose share of employment is above the 
participation of the country in the total European employment. The only other case 
in the sample that count with at least two subsystems above the average is Italy (in 
the Other Transportation and Textiles subsystems). All other countries count one 
Table 1  Distribution of the vertically integrated labour across countries and subsystems (as % of the total 
European labour by subsystem) and share of each country’s total employment in Europe (last column). 
Source: Author’s calculations based on WIOD data
Autom Other Transp. Comp and elec-
tronics
Textiles Total
Austria 1.6 1.4 1.9 1.0 1.9
Belgium 1.7 1.3 1.6 1.4 2.0
Bulgaria 1.0 1.1 1.3 5.4 1.6
Cyprus 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.2
Czech Republic 5.8 2.8 4.3 2.0 2.3
Germany 33.8 26.2 27.7 9.4 19.0
Denmark 0.4 0.5 1.2 0.4 1.2
Spain 5.7 6.9 3.7 7.7 8.0
Estonia 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3
Finland 0.4 0.9 2.4 0.6 1.1
France 6.9 15.9 7.2 6.3 12.1
Great Britain 7.6 10.2 9.6 4.2 13.6
Greece 0.5 0.4 0.7 2.3 1.8
Hungary 3.1 1.2 4.3 1.8 1.9
Ireland 0.4 0.3 1.5 0.4 0.8
Italy 8.4 13.1 8.2 20.3 10.8
Lithuania 0.2 0.2 0.4 1.5 0.6
Luxemburg 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2
Latvia 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.4
Malta 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Netherlands 2.1 3.2 4.0 1.6 3.9
Polonia 8.6 6.6 8.4 9.1 6.9
Portugal 1.2 0.8 1.5 7.2 2.0
Rumania 5.3 3.8 3.8 13.1 3.9
Slovakia 2.2 0.7 1.5 1.4 1.0
Slovenia 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.4
Sweden 2.0 1.7 3.2 0.7 2.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
5 Non-Baltic Easter European countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland 
and Romania.
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or zero subsystems whose share of employment is above their total participation in 
European employment. The importance of the network between Germany and non-
Baltic EE countries in Automotive evidenced in the literature (e.g. Celi et al. 2018; 
IMF 2013) is also emerging from the table. These are the only countries that account 
for an absorption of labour in the Automotive subsystem that is substantially higher 
than their share in total European employment. Another interesting aspect is that in 
all SE countries Textile, the only Low-tech activity among the four analysed in this 
paper, is the most important subsystem in terms of output generation.
Nevertheless, looking exclusively at the total generation of employment by sub-
system provides only partial information. To the purpose of this paper it is impor-
tant to distinguish between the type of employment generated since the incidence 
of intermediate inputs in the generation of employment is not uniform across coun-
tries. In fact, even in countries where a certain subsystem is particularly signifi-
cant in the generation of employment (e.g. non-Baltic EE countries and Germany 
Fig. 3  Share of labour involved in the production of exported intermediate inputs by subsystem. Year 
2014.  Source: Author’s elaboration using the WIOD database
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in Automotive), the participation in the GVC is not equivalent. Figure 3 displays, 
for each country and subsystem, the share of vertically integrated labour absorbed 
by the production of intermediate inputs that are then assembled in third countries. 
This data can be considered a proxy of dependence of a country on the final stages 
of production realised elsewhere. The higher this share, the higher the degree of 
dependence from other countries’ final production and their decisions of allocation 
of production in other countries. A pattern of specialisation based on the production 
of intermediate inputs which will be assembled and/or consumed elsewhere makes 
this production more vulnerable to external demand and shocks, out of control from 
national industrial and fiscal policies.
What emerges from this picture is that the Automotive subsystem accounts for 
the highest share of labour activated in intermediate inputs. In this case, only three 
countries (Germany, Spain, and Great Britain) record less than 40% of total labour 
involved in the production of exported intermediate goods. The level of involvement 
of labour in exported intermediate inputs is lower if we look at the other subsystems, 
although it is still very significant. In the case of Other Transportation and Computer 
and Electronics subsystems, only seven and nine countries respectively have less 
than 40% of total employment that is activated by the production of exported inter-
mediate inputs. Textiles is the only subsystem where most of the countries account 
for less than 40% of labour that is activated by the trade in intermediates, denoting a 
higher role of the domestic supply chain in the generation of employment.
As to the geographical distribution, it appears that EE countries participate mostly 
as producers of intermediate goods and services which are then finally assembled in 
other countries. This is particularly valid for Automotive, with a share of exported 
intermediates between 60 and 80% in Poland and Czech Republic, and Other trans-
portation subsystems. At the same time, the relative importance for this group of 
countries is lower in the manufacture of Computers and Electronics and Textile sub-
system. On the other hand, the fact that countries like Germany record lower shares 
of labour involved in exported-intermediate inputs of production testifies the role of 
this country as final assembler/producer of final goods.
All in all, the empirical evidence reported confirms the strand of literature point-
ing to the strong productive integration characterising Europe as well as the struc-
tural dependence of EE countries on the production of intermediate inputs (espe-
cially in the Automotive and Other Transportation subsystems). SE countries show 
a lower participation in the production of exported intermediates. Note that this is 
especially valid for Textiles, which is also where three countries (Greece, Italy and 
Portugal) record a relative specialisation. This aspect indicates that in these coun-
tries the great majority of labour activated in this subsystem is maintained in the 
domestic supply chain.
By construction, all the employment that is not embodied in intermediate 
exported inputs, is devoted to the domestic production of final goods. This amount 
of labour force can, in turn, be divided between the amount of employment that is 
needed to produce final goods for domestic consumption and final goods that are 
exported to third countries. As noted by Strange (2020, p. 462) the interest about the 
reconfiguration of GVC should not draw the attention away from the fact that many 
products (and jobs) are strongly dependent from the production of final exported 
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goods and services. Table 2 indicates that over the four subsystems, between 49% 
(Textiles) and 69% (Other Transportation) of the employment that is not generated 
in the production of exported intermediate inputs, is activated by the production of 
final goods that are exported. These figures prove the high degree of dependency 
of European labour on international trade. Therefore, it can be concluded that, in 
all the subsystems analysed in this paper, the great majority of the labour force is 
involved in international trade, whether in the production of goods and services that 
are exported as intermediate inputs or as final goods. This aspect should be con-
sidered carefully by policymakers since, given the high degree of dependence on 
external markets, country-level and uncoordinated policies risk to have a dispersed 
and limited effect.
Finally, given the strong productive linkages that exist within these subsystems, it 
is worth asking about the potential impact of the ongoing crisis in terms of potential 
jobs loss and be aware of the risk of possible deepening of the disparities that could 
follow an economic downturn. Although we must be cautious when drawing paral-
lelisms between past and current events, recent experience has proven that the eco-
nomic recessions in the European arena can foster divergent trends across countries. 
In this sense, the response to the Global Financial crisis (2008–2009) and the debt 
crisis (2011–2012) is paradigmatic. Even though the drop of demand affected all 
countries in Europe, the harsh austerity policies that were implemented in SE coun-
tries fuelled divergent trends in Europe. Employing Input–Output analysis, Garbel-
lini et  al. (2014) demonstrate that while austerity measures impacted the level of 
activity in the Eurozone, some core countries (e.g. Germany, Austria) responded to 
this shock looking outward the European space, replacing the drop in demand of 
the European periphery with more intense relationships with BRIC countries. These 
tendencies contributed to the divergent path of growth of SE countries compared to 
core countries. The consolidation of the divergent trends in Europe and the negative 
role of austerity policies has been shown also by Kohler and Stockhammer (2020), 
Fig. 4  Estimated loss of units (thousands) of employment by subsystem in 2020.  Source: Author’s elab-
oration using the WIOD database (year = 2014) and Baker and McKenzie (2020) forecast for the fall in 
global production of each sector
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while Gräbner et al. (2020a, b) show that income, unemployment and technological 
capabilities between core and periphery have diverged considerably after 2008.
In the present analysis, we build the estimations of the possible repercussions on 
employment using McKenzie (2020) forecast that, for 2020 reports a drop of 13% 
in the global production of the Automotive sector, 8% for Computer and Electronics 
and Textiles and 5% for Other Transportation. At this stage, it is still not possible 
to provide a precise analysis of the extent of the shock on the existing productive 
structures. Assuming that the fall in the level of final demand by industry will be 
distributed evenly across European countries, Fig. 4 shows the impact that the eco-
nomic recession may have in terms of employment. Note that the assumption that 
the impact of the drop in demand will be equally distributed across European coun-
tries is a strong one. Much of the impact in terms of job loss will depend on the con-
sequences that the Covid-19 crisis will have in terms of activity and on the measures 
put in place by the governments and international institutions to contrast the crisis. 
Moreover, most countries have implemented job retention schemes to support more 
vulnerable workers reducing at least in the very short terms the impact in terms of 
job loss. However, these measures differ in their extent (duration, selection criteria 
etc.) and are meant to be temporary (OECD 2020b). This implies that the impact on 
the employment due to the Covid-19 crisis may not be fully tangible in the short run 
but will need a period to adjust. Furthermore, the fiscal stimuli that will be intro-
duced in the upcoming years may reduce the negative impact in terms of employ-
ment and countries that have a more active role in industrial policies may react more 
effectively than others. At the same time, changes in the patterns in final demand 
may favour some countries rather than others. For example, the growth of digitalisa-
tion and automation may boost those activities related to the Computers and Elec-
tronic subsystem, compared to more traditional activities such as Textiles. Finally, 
the modality of insertion in the productive chain may place countries in different 
positions when designing industrial policies. Countries that are mainly providers of 
intermediate inputs may be in a more fragile position in designing expansive meas-
ures compared to other countries (that lead the production process). Acknowledging 
these aspects, as an empirical exercise, we believe that it is still useful to offer a pre-
liminary scenario of the potential impact of the crisis which takes into account direct 
and indirect relation of production as well as the international linkages of produc-
tion. This exercise allows to visualise the potential degree of pervasiveness of the 
economic downturns on the European economy. Moreover, the analysis proposed in 
Fig. 4 distinguishes between jobs involved directly in the production of final goods 
(domestically consumed or exported) and those involved indirectly in the production 
of intermediate goods.
Over the four subsystems 1.3 million people can be affected by the drop in the 
level of activity. The impact is expected to be particularly marked in the Automo-
tive subsystem, as a result of the high amount of labour that it generates in Europe 
(see Fig. 2) and the expectation of a more accentuated reduction of output compared 
to the other industries. Given the relatively higher importance of the German-non-
Baltic EE network (Table 1), it is likely that these countries would be more affected 
by the downturn. In EE countries this impact will affect predominantly the activi-
ties that provide exported intermediate inputs, while in Germany the repercussions 
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would be more evident in the activities involved in the domestic production of final 
goods. Textiles is expected to be the second most hit subsystem. In this case, the 
effects on employment are likely to be more localised, since the employment in this 
subsystem is less dependent on the exports of intermediate inputs compared to the 
others. Given the importance of this subsystem (see Table 1), SE countries are more 
exposed to the fall in final demand in this subsystem.
5  Conclusions
The Covid-19 crisis is going to have deep repercussions on the European econo-
mies. This paper provides a preliminary assessment of the consequences that it may 
have in terms of jobs loss in four subsystems which employ (directly and indirectly) 
more that 13 million of workers at the European level.
A first aspect that emerges from this analysis is the high degree of dependence 
of employment on foreign demand via the export of intermediate inputs or final 
goods. Around two thirds of total employment in these subsystems is generated in 
the production of goods and services that are exported (as intermediate inputs or 
final goods). The impact on jobs generated by these subsystems can potentially be 
considerable, involving more than 1.3 million of people in Europe. The effects of the 
crisis are likely to be deeper in the Automotive subsystem, which is also the subsys-
tem which accounts for the most developed network of indirect productive relations.
One crucial consequence of the trade in intermediate in the last decades is that 
an increasing share of employment is linked to the decisions taken by companies 
located elsewhere, which makes employment more vulnerable to decisions taken 
in third countries. Despite the growth in intermediate is a generalised trend, the 
intensity of production of intermediate inputs is not uniform across countries. What 
emerges from our study is a divide between Germany, EE and SE countries. In par-
ticular, Germany is specialised in more technologically advanced subsystems. In 
this country, the amount of employment generated by these subsystems is consid-
erable and it is mostly concentrated in the domestic supply chain, as testified by 
the low share of employment embodied in the exports of intermediate inputs. The 
four subsystems analysed in this paper are also very important for the EE block. 
However, their participation in the productive chain is at odds with respect to Ger-
many. In fact, these countries contribute mainly as providers of exported intermedi-
ate inputs of production which puts them in a more fragile (dependent) position in 
the production network as they are highly reliant on the investment decisions taken 
in other countries. Finally, these subsystems are relatively less important for the gen-
eration of employment in SE countries. Here, the most relevant subsystem is Tex-
tiles. Moreover, in this case, the productive network is more domestic centred since 
the great majority of employment (direct and indirect) activated by this subsystem is 
embodied in the domestic production of final goods.
In light of these results, we can advance some considerations regarding the future 
of European production networks. It is possible that the Covid-19 crisis will con-
tribute to reshape the GVC. However, it is important to be cautious when tackling 
the hypothesis that a significant process of reshoring within Europe will take place 
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soon. Unless there will be new differentiated and prolonged production lockdown 
measures or a radical institutional reconfiguration, it is reasonable to expect that the 
strong dependence on external markets will persist. European countries will still be 
highly dependent on external markets, at least in the short run. Moreover, it is not to 
exclude that the process of offshoring may intensify. Firms may be willing to exploit 
even more the wage differentials (which, in a context of high unemployment will 
possibly be maintained) pursuing further relocation of production in third countries 
to reinforce their profitability. This process may also be facilitated by geographical 
proximity and by the European infrastructure which plays a relevant role in facilitat-
ing productive integration (Landesmann and Stöllinger 2019).
The evidence provided here shows that the impact on employment of the COVID 
crisis is going to be severe and spread across countries. As a consequence, the 
measures that will be implemented by policymakers should consider the existing 
productive relationships across European supply chains. National policy measures 
are undoubtfully welcome in order to restore the level of activity and employment. 
However, the high dependence on foreign markets, via the exports of intermediate 
inputs and final goods, indicates that domestic fiscal expansion alone may be insuf-
ficient to restore employment levels, since most of the employment is dependent 
on external demand. Previous episodes have proven that economic crises can boost 
divergent trends in the European arena. Given the possibility that regional chains 
will be favoured compared to GVC (Zhan et al. 2020), it is crucial that policy makers 
in the EU design coordinated policy measures across countries in line with what has 
been proposed elsewhere (e.g. Coveri et al. 2020; Gräbner et al. 2020a, b). Moreo-
ver, industrial policies should be implemented, conceiving an evolving context and 
be concerned with the modification of the existing productive configuration (Pianta 
2015). Since an undifferentiated fiscal stimulus would not affect evenly European 
countries, it is necessary to implement catching-up measures aimed at the conver-
sion and upgrading of the productive structure of the peripheral areas of Europe 
that do not benefit from the existing specialisation pattern. This, of course, would 
imply the deep reconsideration of the stringent European regulations that have so far 
impeded the development of such policies (Pianta et al. 2020). There is no doubt that 
the current crisis will impact on the European economies. What is contended today 
is the response that institutions will be able to put in place. Given the primary role 
that the public sphere is expected to have in this picture, this new context may also 
allow to tackle pending crucial aspects regarding productive integration in Europe.
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